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Rejoinder
Stephen E. Fienberg
The three discussants have offered three comple-
mentary perspectives on the material in my paper
and in different ways help to sharpen the focus on
the appropriateness and utility of the Bayesian per-
spective in government and policy settings. I am in-
debted to them for their comments and critiques,
which by and large remain couched in compliments,
for which I also thank them!
I did consider responding using a variation on
Alan Zaslavsky’s clever culinary metaphor. But it
would be difficult to match him tit for tat as he
was even able to adapt Jimmie Savage’s (1961) oft-
repeated remark that the Fisherian fiducial school’s
approach was “a bold attempt to make the Bayesian
omelet without breaking the Bayesian eggs,” to ap-
ply to some modern frequentists who borrow from
Bayesian ideas. In the end, I decided to simply of-
fer a few observations of why I think so much has
changed over the past 50 years, with the hope that
these might explain why I differ with a number of
the comments from the discussants.
My education as a statistician goes back to the
early 1960s when the number of people expressing
strong Bayesian perspectives could fit in a small
seminar room at a university, and we often did so
as part of the Seminar in Bayesian Econometrics
that the late Arnold Zellner convened twice a year.
Applications in those days typically meant small-
scale numerical illustrations using conjugate priors
for analytical convenience, and Bayesian approaches
were rarely taught in statistical courses except for at
a handful of places, and then only to graduate stu-
dents. The towering achievement of Mosteller and
Wallace (1964) in bringing a systematic Bayesian
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approach to the analysis of the Federalist Papers
thus served as an eye-opener to the statistical com-
munity and showed that Bayesians could do serious
substantive applications that harnessed the power
of the largest computers of the time. For some in-
sights into their effort I recommend Chapter 4 of
Mosteller’s 2010 posthumously-published autobiog-
raphy on this work.
For most of today’s readers of Statistical Science,
it may be hard to imagine the almost complete dom-
inance of the frequentist perspective in our jour-
nals and in application fifty years ago. It was in
part for this reason that I began my examples with
some details on the NBC Election Night Forecasting
team from the 1960s because it too was an anomaly.
On the other hand, something that was true in the
1960s, as it is today, was that most statistical educa-
tion and research was built around statistical models
and inference from them. The principal departure
from this model-based perspective came in the area
of sample surveys, where essentially the only source
of random variation considered by authors and prac-
titioners was that associated with the random selec-
tion of the sample and this then provided the basis
for inference about population quantities—what we
now describe as design-based inference. This per-
spective was so deeply embedded in the operations
of national statistical agencies that it still remains
through to today. I remember making a presentation
in the late 1970s at a sample survey symposium on
why one should view surveys on crime victimiza-
tion in the context of longitudinal models for indi-
vidual respondents and households, in which I criti-
cized the narrow cross-sectional perspective adopted
by the U.S. Census Bureau in its work on the Na-
tional Crime Survey (which was in fact a longitudi-
nal survey but not analyzed as such). My remarks
were barely completed when Morris Hansen, who
was seated in the front row, stood and took me to
task because I did not understand the limitation of
my perspective and the fact that government agen-
cies understood the limitations of the data they col-
lected and why models had no place in their analysis.
Even in the 1950s and 1960s, frequentists were be-
ing influenced by Bayesian ideas, and Charles Stein’s
results on shrinkage estimation, which were later
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adapted in the form of empirical Bayesian estima-
tion by Efron and Morris (1973), drew heavily on
the form of Bayesian weighting of sample quantities
with prior ones, albeit with a frequentist outcome in
mind. Several of us taught this Bayesian motivation
to students at the University of Chicago, where I was
a faculty member from 1968 to 1972, and I suspect
this may have indirectly influenced Bob Fay, who
was my undergraduate advisee and who later co-
authored with Roger Herriot their landmark paper
on small area estimation (Fay and Herriot, 1979).
The foregoing is a somewhat longwinded way of
explaining why, to paraphrase the Virginia Slims
commercial from the 1960s, “we’ve come a long way,
baby,” Graham Kalton’s protestations to the con-
trary. When I first visited the Census Bureau, shortly
after my exchange with Morris Hansen, few of the
statisticians could even understand my ideas on log-
linear models and their relevance to census activ-
ities. This has changed quite markedly, although
many in the agencies have strong training in statisti-
cal theory and methodology, the remains resistance
to explaining the model-based and often Bayesian
motivation of approaches being advocated, even
though there is internal recognition of this strong
influence. This is especially true in the context of
post-enumeration surveys for assessing censal accu-
racy. Where Kalton and I disagree strongly is on the
use of models to analyze and interpret the results
of large-scale government social surveys. For exam-
ple, most of the interesting analyses of the Current
Population Survey (CPS), used in the U.S. to pro-
duce the monthly unemployment rate, are based on
statistical models and on the implicit longitudinal
structure of the survey. This is certainly the perspec-
tive of most policy analysts outside the government
who use the CPS in their work.
Zaslavsky notes that one of the aspects of the ob-
jective Bayesian school is its use of Bayes as a de-
vice to generate calibrated (frequentist) probabil-
ity statements. That is clearly a substantial part
of the modern literature, but it should play little
role in many applications, I believe. Consider disclo-
sure limitation to protect confidentiality in statisti-
cal databases. We are surely interested less in pro-
tecting an infinite sequence of hypothetic databases
generated using the same probabilistic mechanism
than we are in protecting the database at hand, once
we have collected it. Thus conditioning on the data
we have rather than the data we might have had
makes eminently more sense to me. If an objective
prior at the top of a hierarchical model can succeed
in doing this, I certainly have no objections.
Zaslavsky also refers to the practice of Bayesian
model averaging. Again this is a place where we do
not fully agree. I see Bayesian model averaging as fit-
ting well within the subjective Bayesian paradigm,
but primarily for prediction-like problems where dif-
ferent models could conceivably have quite different
and possibly non-overlapping specifications. When
model averaging is used for inference about param-
eters in models, however, the results are often non-
sensical, because the “same parameter” in different
models often has a totally different meaning depend-
ing on the rest of the model specification. Regression
analysis offers a good example of this phenomenon.
David Hand notes that all models are approxima-
tions at best, and both he and Graham Kalton re-
fer to George Box’s famous dictum that “all models
are wrong, but some are useful.” I agree and I also
agree with Hand that any approach to the analysis
of data in practice requires much more than invok-
ing the Bayesian mantra. Statisticians really need to
know what they are doing, both substantively and
statistically. A Bayesian algorithm does not neces-
sarily make for a good Bayesian analysis and proper
inferences. Hand’s example of borrowing strength in
large sparse tables of adverse reactions in the post-
marketing surveillance of drugs harks back to many
of the earlier examples of Bayesian ideas and meth-
ods I refer to in the paper. I thank him for this and
the other examples.
All three discussants caution that Bayesian meth-
ods are not the answer to all policy problems. I agree,
and I often adopt likelihood-based methods in my
own work when a de novo Bayesian approach seems
forbidding. I remain a subjective Bayesian, however,
and no longer see the “threat” of subjective priors as
a major obstacle to the adoption of Bayesian meth-
ods and analyses.
Does one size fit all? Of course not. But Bayesians
come in all stripes and varieties today and they work
on diverse applications. I believe we can look for-
ward to the increasing use of Bayesian methods in
many domains, including those described in my pa-
per.
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